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THE UNITED STATES
AND WESTERN EUROPE
SINCE 1945

OXFORD

In planning for the postwar world President Franklin D. Roosevelt consistently feared that he might become another Wilson, one who wished for and planned for America's involvement in Europe, but who had his plans defeated by the Senate and the public; but, although he was not to experience this himself, since he died on 12 April 1945, FDR's fears were to prove groundless. America was finally prepared to play the role that its economic power had for so long and its military power now so clearly indicated.

Notes

1. The literature on isolationism is vast. I have benefited particularly from Selig Adler, *The Isolationist Impulse: Its Twentieth-Century Reaction* (London: Collier-Macmillan, 1957); Manfred Jonas, *Isolationism in America, 1935-1941* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1966); Wayne S. Cole, *Roosevelt and the Isolationists 1932-45* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1983).
2. Most of this and the following paragraphs follow my "Empire by Invitation in the American Century," *Diplomatic History*, 23:2 (Spring 1999), 190-4.
3. US Department of Commerce, *Historical Statistics of the United States: Colonial Times to 1970* (Washington, DC, 1975), vol. 2, 870-1, 903, 906.
4. Lundestad, "Empire by Invitation in the American Century," 193.
5. In the vast literature on American-British relations during the Second World War I prefer Christopher Thorne, *Allies of a Kind: The United States, Britain, and the War Against Japan, 1941-1945* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978). A stimulating recent article on the relationship is Robert Skidelsky, "Imbalance of Power," *Foreign Policy*, 129 (March/April 2002), 46-55.

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Cooperation Established: "Empire" by Invitation, 1945-1950

America's Position of Strength¹

In June 1947 British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin argued that the United States was in the position today where Britain was at the end of the Napoleonic wars. Historians have also argued that the American position in 1945 resembled that of the British in 1815. Both countries had completed a triumphant war; their technological revolutions had really taken off; their rivals were exhausted, and it seemed that they both could more or less control world markets.

In absolute as well as in relative terms, America's position after the Second World War was much stronger than Britain's had been at the height of *Pax Britannica*. It was certainly much stronger than the Soviet position after 1945. In fact, the United States was by far the strongest power the world had ever seen; true, its influence was limited by that of the Soviet Union, but even the Roman empire had been restricted largely to the Mediterranean world. Strong separate empires existed in China, India, and Iran. Harold Laski, British professor of political science, writer, and Labour politician, may have overdone it, but he was still closer to the mark than Bevin when, in November 1947, he wrote that:

America bestrides the world like a colossus; neither Rome at the height of its power nor Great Britain in the period of its economic supremacy enjoyed an influence so direct, so profound, or so pervasive... Today literally hundreds of millions of Europeans and Asiatics know that both the quality and the rhythm of their lives depend upon decisions made in Washington. On the wisdom of those decisions hangs the fate of the next generation.²

America's strength rested on four main pillars: its vast economic superiority, its substantial military lead, the broad domestic base for the foreign policy pursued, and America's strong international-ideological support. The economic base was the most impressive. In constant 1958 prices the American GNP had grown from 209.4 billion dollars in 1939 to 355.2 billion in 1945. Moreover, "only" 400,000 Americans had lost their lives during the war, whereas in the Soviet Union approximately 27 million had died and steel

and agricultural production had been cut in half. Overall Soviet production figures are not known, but an earlier guess that in 1945 Soviet production may have been only one-fourth of that in the US is probably much too high.

In the nineteenth century Britain probably had the world's largest GNP for only a very short period around 1860, and although for much of the century Britain was the industrial leader, and also remained the commercial leader, at no time did it produce more than roughly one-third of the world's total manufacture. But in 1945 the United States produced almost as much as the rest of the world together, and its lead tended to be greater the more advanced the technology. In the decade 1940-50 the United States was behind 82 per cent of major inventions, discoveries, and innovations. The highest corresponding percentage for Britain had been 47 per cent in 1750-75. With 6 per cent of the world's population, the United States had 46 per cent of the world's electric power; its businesses controlled 59 per cent of the world's total oil reserves. America produced 100 times more cars than the Soviet Union and eight times as many as Germany, Britain, and France combined. In 1950 the US held 49.8 per cent of the world's monetary gold, reserve currencies, and IMF reserves.

There were some areas of economic life where Britain played a more important role in the nineteenth century than did the United States after the Second World War. Thus, British foreign trade constituted a higher percentage of world trade than American trade was ever to do. For example, in 1870 Britain had 24 per cent of world trade; in 1950 the corresponding US percentage was 18.4. But in the trade field it is difficult to know where economic and political leverage ends and vulnerability and dependence begin. The United States traded considerably less; the other side of the coin was that it was much more self-sufficient in manufactured goods and also in important strategic raw materials and food.

With the reconstruction after the Second World War and the rapid economic growth in most of the world in the 1950s, the US share of world production was bound to diminish. In 1950 the United States produced about 40 per cent of world GNP; in 1960 around 30 per cent. Yet, the United States continued to enjoy a lead over its chief rivals much bigger than Britain had ever done in the nineteenth century. In 1960 the United States had 59 per cent of world foreign investments. That was probably slightly more than Britain had at its highest (although, as for trade, in relation to the size of their economies foreign investment was much more important for Britain than for the United States). In the 1950s the US provided over half of global development assistance, an instrument that barely existed before the Second World War.

The interwar years had been a period of transition where the United States was beginning to replace Britain as the world's economic leader, but was doing so in a very half-hearted way. As Charles Kindleberger has argued, the lack of an international leader was probably an important factor in the

Depression of the 1930s.³ After 1945 the international economic system was dominated by the United States to an even larger extent than Britain had dominated the system before the First World War, for, unlike Britain, whose main trading partners had been its political rivals, the United States had the advantage of trading primarily with its political allies, which strengthened America's role even further. The United States was the undisputed leader of the "free world." The political and economic arrangements set up after the Second World War, such as the United Nations (UN), the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), and even the Organization for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), were all based on Washington's leadership. Despite this structure's imperfections, it still revealed America's supreme role.

The United States had rather clear-cut economic objectives, the most important of which had to do with the strengthening of economic multilateralism and, as the crucial point under this heading, the promotion of freer trade. The goal was for the market to be the invisible hand which guided international exchange (at least after a period of transition to correct the many imbalances created by the war and with some exceptions, such as for instance those few products where the US itself was not fully competitive). The unstated underlying premise for Britain earlier and for the United States now was that as the strongest economic power it would enjoy great advantages under a regime of freer trade.

The United States did have all the characteristics of an economic leader.⁴ First, through the IMF and bilateral diplomacy it helped maintain the international structure of exchange rates. The dollar was tied to gold and all the other international currencies were tied to the dollar, in a way similar to what had been the case with the Classical Gold Standard (1870-1914) under British leadership. Due to the imbalance in trade between the United States and Western Europe, full convertibility with the dollar was only introduced in 1958, but the basic structure of the Bretton Woods system lasted from 1945 until 1971-3 when the dollar was taken off the gold standard and exchange rates were permitted to float.

Second, the United States maintained a flow of capital to borrowers in the same way the British had done in the nineteenth century. All in all the United States provided bilateral credits and grants to the tune of slightly more than 100 billion dollars in the years from 1945 to 1965. Practically every country in the world received some form of support and in most cases the United States was by far the most important source of outside support. In addition, the United States dominated the World Bank, as it did the IMF, both through economically weighted voting arrangements and in other ways.

America served as a lender of last resort in financial and economic crises, the clearest example of which is the 14 billion dollars provided to Western

Europe under the Marshall Plan. Both regular capital and crisis money would normally come with certain strings attached. The exact nature of the strings varied, but they all tended to strengthen Washington's influence. Under the Marshall Plan, as Theodore H. White wrote from France, the American "expert" "has become... as much a stock character as was the British traveler of the nineteenth century, as 2,000 years ago the Roman centurion must have been in conquered Greece."⁵

Third, the United States provided a market for distress goods from political friends. This was not so much of a need for the Western European countries, since their problem was not really to get rid of surplus production, although they certainly needed to export to the United States to earn hard currency. For the Japanese, however, who had difficulties finding markets for their goods well into the 1950s, the open American market was essential. Even more important, during critical shortages the United States could increase or share supplies. Thus, during the Iranian oil nationalization of 1951 and the Suez crisis of 1956 the United States could compensate for the shortages in the world's oil supplies more or less single-handed.

Fourth, Washington was the leader in coordinating international macroeconomic policies, particularly trade policies. Under America's leadership world trade moved steadily in a more liberal direction. The GATT system based on the Most Favored Nation principle was the key in this context. Reciprocity was basic. The stress on reciprocity also made the American position stronger than the British had been in the nineteenth century, in that the British tended to believe in free trade as a matter of faith, almost regardless of what others did.

Fifth, the United States dominated the international property regime. In the nineteenth century the British had established a property regime strongly biased in favor of the British investor. Expropriations of foreign investments were discouraged and if they nevertheless did take place, full compensation was expected. There were few challenges to this system and those that did arise were generally defeated through a combination of bondholder sanctions and use of the Royal Navy. After 1945 the United States was able to establish a similarly strong regime in the non-Communist world biased in favor of (American) multinationals. Until the late 1960s this system worked well, as seen from Washington, in part because US resources were sufficiently strong and concentrated to "punish threats to, absorb the costs of, and bribe medium powers into regime maintenance." Most challenges to the property regime were defeated, in a few cases by covert means (Iran, 1953; Guatemala, 1954).⁶

The strong economy provided the basis for America's military strength. The dollar and the atomic bomb became not only the supreme symbols of America's strength; they also represented important realities of power in most parts of the world. Until 1949 the United States had a monopoly on the atomic bomb. The bomb was not as decisive a card in international relations as many

Truman administration policymakers had initially hoped, but it certainly strengthened America's role and many Americans and Europeans saw it as the main deterrent to Soviet aggression.

The United States had by far the strongest air force in the world. In 1944—at its highest—America's production of aircraft—95,000—surpassed that of Japan and Germany combined. Before the Second World War the Royal Navy was still slightly larger than the US Navy. The war changed that, so much so that the American Navy now had a control of the sea more absolute than was ever possessed by the British. The Soviet blue-water navy was quite small until the 1960s.

The only American weakness was the number of personnel, particularly on the army side. During the war the US and the Soviets both had about 12 million men under arms. Although the Soviets demobilized more than was recognized at the time and came down to 2.8 million in 1948, American strength was only about half of that. This number was more than doubled as a result of the outbreak of the Korean War, but the Soviets did remain far ahead in this one area.

Yet, the Second World War had given most dramatic evidence of how quickly the United States could shift from a civilian to a military economy. It is difficult to come up with good estimates of Soviet military spending, but there can be little doubt that overall the United States outspent the Soviet Union. In fact, by one estimate, as late as 1960 the US alone stood for 51 per cent of world military spending while it had 13 per cent of total personnel.

Before the war the United States had no allies and no US troops were stationed on territory it did not directly control; after it Washington entered into numerous alliances, and bases were established in the most disparate regions of the world. Geographically the postwar expansion was least noticeable in Latin America, because this had traditionally been the US backyard. The Monroe Doctrine had been Washington's unilateral proclamation of its special role in the Western hemisphere, and in 1940-1 Franklin D. Roosevelt extended the Doctrine hundreds of miles out to sea, implied that Canada fell under it, and even broadened it to cover Greenland (1940) and Iceland (1941). Privately the President believed that the Canaries, the Azores, and even West Africa should be covered too because of their strategic importance for the Western hemisphere.

In 1945-6 the Joint Chiefs' lists of essential bases illustrated how dramatically the war had expanded America's security requirements. The six most essential ones were found in widely scattered parts of the world: Greenland, Iceland, the Azores, Casablanca, the Galapagos, and Panama. There is no agreed definition of a "base," but, by one count, in 1955 the United States had 450 bases in thirty-six countries.

The domestic political side was the third pillar of America's strength. Since the Civil War the United States had probably had the largest GNP in the

world; its economic lead was vast even before the Second World War. Yet, despite this economic basis, the US had rather limited military strength (in 1940 defense expenditures still stood at less than two billion dollars). Most important of all, politically the United States had little desire to be a world power. Thus, until the Second World War a vast discrepancy existed between the resources of the US on the one hand and its willingness to use these resources in Great Power politics on the other.

The events of the Second World War brought about a revolution in American attitudes. Isolationism in its traditional form was destroyed. After 1945 the United States joined the United Nations and took part in the occupations of Japan, Germany, Italy, and Austria. Defense spending, even in the low years from 1946 to 1950, was much higher than before the Second World War. In the course of 1946–7 a remarkable consensus developed on the main lines of America's foreign policy, particularly the containment policy toward the Soviet Union. Secretary of Commerce Henry Wallace's alternative on the left, which stressed a greater understanding for Soviet views, was not really seriously considered by the Truman administration, as was confirmed by Wallace's ouster from the Cabinet in the fall of 1946; his dismal showing in the 1948 presidential election ratified his defeat. Senator Robert Taft's unilateralist-isolationist alternative on the right had greater support, but even his partial opposition to the Marshall Plan and his more direct opposition to NATO was of limited importance. Taft's failure to win the Republican nomination in 1952 and his death soon thereafter signaled the decline of even this kind of right-wing criticism of containment.

First Germany and Japan had to be occupied. Then the Soviet Union had to be contained. To do all this the United States had to station forces abroad, and later enter into alliances—even outside the Western hemisphere, and in peacetime too; defense spending had to be much higher than in the past, although there was still disagreement as to exactly how high. Thus, almost all leading Democrats and most Republicans rallied around an ideology which could possibly be viewed, as Franz Schurman sees it, as a merger of internationalism and the nationalism which had formed such a strong part of the isolationist tradition. The isolationists had originally wanted to protect the uniqueness of America from the rest of the world, but, now the United States had become so strong, it could not only remain uncontaminated by the evils of the Old World, but even export America's own values to it.⁷

Institutionally America's policies were drawn up on the basis of strong executive leadership, but also presidential-congressional bipartisanship. The President and the executive branch had relatively firm control of the foreign policy process. Despite a Republican majority in Congress during 1947–8, all the major foreign policy initiatives taken by the Truman administration—the loan to Britain, the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, even the Vandenberg

Resolution leading to NATO—were in the end approved by Congress, although in most cases after months of persuasion. The Truman–Vandenberg model of bipartisanship was modified with Truman's reelection in 1948, the "loss of China," and senator Vandenberg's death, but much remained. In 1953, with internationalist Republican Dwight D. Eisenhower in the White House, bipartisanship was in great part restored. Most of Eisenhower's problems in fact came from his own Republican right.

Ideologically British imperialism had rested upon a sense of superiority. Great Britain stood for Christianity and "Western civilization," for material benefits and economic advancement. The crucial point was not that this belief was held by most Englishmen, but that for a long time it was also shared by most of the peoples subjected to their rule. In fact, so self-evident was this belief in the first half of the nineteenth century that it did not really have to be very actively promoted. Only with what could be seen as Britain's slow decline from the 1870s were these "truths" spelled out in any great detail through exhibitions, jubilees, the press, and the schools. The superiority was closely related to race. The white race was seen as superior to the yellow which in turn was superior to the black. (Within the white race Anglo-Saxons or Northern Europeans stood above Southern Europeans.) In this sense British colonialism was different from French, in that in theory at least the French came to stress culture over race. If you adopted French culture, you could also achieve the rights of a Frenchman.

In Marxism–Leninism the Soviet Union had an ideology with claims to historical inevitability and global validity. The class struggle could not be held back. The masses would prevail over the ruling capitalist classes. The world was bound to move from feudalism to capitalism, then to socialism, and finally, the highest stage, Communism. Thus, like the British, the Soviets possessed an ideology that could justify many forms of expansion.

To an ever larger extent the United States had an ideology that could not only unify the American people, but also justify expansion and serve to attract support abroad. True, there were elements in America's culture that were not particularly attractive to foreigners: the very strong sense of national mission, a definite hostility toward social revolutions, and a lingering racial classification of peoples. The Truman administration, and Secretary of State Dean Acheson in particular, in Dean Rusk's phrase, generally "overlooked the brown, black, and yellow peoples of the world." The Eisenhower administration was largely passive on the race issue, despite the rapidly growing number of Third World countries. Southerners, from Secretary of State James Byrnes to Senator William Fulbright, generally had to support the racism of their region if they wanted to maintain their political base.⁸

In the European context these elements were not so negative as in other parts of the world. The crucial point here was America's identification with

democracy or, in its almost equally common negative version, its opposition to Soviet totalitarianism. On this overriding point agreement prevailed between most Western Europeans and virtually all Americans.

In its imperial heyday Britain faced opposition from many local sources, but it was not consistently challenged by any one Great Power. France was the primary colonial rival, but was occasionally overshadowed by Russia; in the early twentieth century the French threat was replaced by the German. But after 1945 the United States faced one consistent threat, the Soviet Union, which provided the American people with a unifying anti-Communist ideology. As we shall see, the perceived threat probably also provided the single most important reason for the many European invitations issued to the United States to increase its economic, political, and military role. And the United States could deliver; America's role rested on tremendous economic and military strength.

It was also very important that the United States represented a culture that was attractive to millions around the world. Its mass-based popular culture was to reach new and higher levels of influence in the years after the Second World War. This was the result of the enhanced position of the US in international relations in general, but it also reflected the weakening of more traditional elitist European culture. Anti-Americanism was strong within certain elites, which perceived American mass culture as vulgar. Since the experience of the Second World War stimulated the democratization of European societies, widening opportunities for the masses normally also meant the strengthening of America's cultural role.

The task of the administration in general and of the State Department in particular was to make the various countries open their borders so that America's culture could flow as freely as possible around the world. This was a standard objective in US bilateral negotiations with virtually every country, but not one always agreed to by the other party to those negotiations, for political, economic, or cultural reasons. In the occupied countries (Japan, Germany, and Italy) the United States tried to restructure entire societies in great part inspired by American ideals and practices.

Once the diplomats had provided the opening, American movies, music, and literature spread quickly in most Western European countries. Attempts for various reasons to ban American products were generally short-lived. Thus, the French ban on Coke in 1949-50, allegedly for health reasons, lasted little more than a year. A very important new instrument in the strengthening of America's cultural influence was the Fulbright program passed by Congress in 1946. Although in principle the program was a reciprocal arrangement between the United States and other countries, the most significant part was the bringing of large groups of foreign scholars and students to the United States. Other factors also helped make the United States "the educational

capital in the world." In 1943-4 only 7,000 foreign students studied at American universities and colleges, in 1947-8 17,000 did, and in 1949-50 26,000. The passage of the Smith-Mundt Act in 1948 made it possible for the US government to use all its educational, information, and propaganda resources in the struggle against the Soviet Union. While Europeans could not be made into Americans, the attractiveness of American culture was such that over time Europeans became somewhat more like Americans.⁹

Interest, ideology, and concern for others flowed together in a seamless web. As Truman privately expressed it, "We are faced with the most terrible responsibility that any nation ever faced. From Darius I's Persia, Alexander's Greece, Hadrian's Rome, Victoria's Britain, no nation or group of nations has had our responsibilities." It was now America's task "to save the world from totalitarianism."¹⁰

While America was unique, it was at the same time allegedly upholding universal values such as international cooperation, democracy, and freer trade. The possible tension between uniqueness and universalism was rarely explored. Foreigners, particularly Europeans, often supported America's leadership and shared many of its values. In most countries support for the United States far exceeded that for the Soviet Union. This was certainly the case in the democratic European countries where public opinion could be most easily measured.

Yet, even friendly foreigners were bound to comment on the extent to which America's idealism coincided with rather ordinary national interests. In 1945 Winston Churchill, as close a friend of America as any, captured this skeptical note almost perfectly when, faced with yet another American lecture on the evils of power politics, he replied: "Is having a Navy twice as strong as any other power 'power politics'? Is having an overwhelming Air Force, with bases all over the world, 'power politics'? Is having all the gold in the world buried in a cavern 'power politics'? If not, what is 'power politics'?"¹¹

The United States, the World, and Western Europe

Franklin Roosevelt's ambition had been to establish a global system based on American-inspired principles, an ambition strongly supported both by the State and the Treasury departments. The State Department focused on the political side, in the form of the United Nations. Hopes for the new organization were high at the founding conference in San Francisco in April-June 1945, in part stimulated by the guilt the United States felt for not having participated in the League of Nations. Soon, however, it became evident that the UN would not function in the way Washington had hoped, for although the United States had strongly supported the basic concept of the Great Powers—certainly including

the US itself—having a veto in all matters of importance, when the Soviet Union started using its veto rather frequently, the Truman administration began to lose interest in the United Nations. Soon even Washington began to launch major initiatives with little regard for the position of the United Nations. The Truman Doctrine was to symbolize the new trend, although the negative response of an American public that had been taught and had then accepted much of the new UN ideology forced the administration to make some rhetorical connections between the new initiative and the UN. Despite these difficulties, the Korean War showed how useful the UN could be to the US.

On the economic side Washington and the Treasury Department were pinning their hopes first on the IMF and the World Bank, then on the International Trade Organization (ITO) and GATT. In the early negotiations on the international monetary system the British had considerable leverage, because of their traditional role in this field, the need for consensus between the two leading trading powers, and their negotiating skills. John Maynard Keynes, the British chief negotiator, put forward a radical plan for an international clearing union based on a world central bank. The hope was that this would guarantee deficit countries, as the United Kingdom was expected to be, plentiful liquidity while preventing surplus countries, primarily the United States, from pursuing policies that could lead to a global liquidity shortage.

The United States rejected the Keynes plan and instead made its own White plan, named after Treasury official Harry Dexter White, the basis of IMF. The White plan was an ambitious undertaking compared with earlier rudimentary arrangements, but fell short of Keynes's hopes. The IMF would thus be based on members' contributions of gold and foreign exchange. Countries would be able to borrow very limited amounts from the Fund on a conditional basis to finance temporary balance-of-payments problems. At the Bretton Woods Conference in 1944 the British were able to secure modifications in the White plan. Scarce currencies could be rationed and discriminatory trade and exchange conditions were to be permitted in an unspecified transition period after the end of the war, a greater degree of national sovereignty accepted for Britain over the exchange rate than had been initially envisaged. Despite these modifications, the IMF and the World Bank were to prove useful instruments in the US-dominated structure now established.

On the trade side the Roosevelt administration, particularly inspired by Secretary of State Cordell Hull, had worked to establish a global system of freer trade. This meant the dismantling of imperial preferences and other forms of discrimination. This ideology had been expressed before the war in the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934 and the many bilateral agreements flowing from that act; during the war it had been manifested in important clauses in the Atlantic Charter of 1941 and in the various Lend-Lease agreements; after the war this ideology underpinned America's many bilateral

loans. The United States was generally much more insistent on removing the trade barriers of other countries than on dismantling the still relatively high level of US tariffs.

In the December 1945 bilateral loan Britain agreed to eliminate imperial preferences. The US Treasury also pressed London to accept the convertibility of sterling within eighteen months. When London then introduced such convertibility in July 1947, a run on sterling immediately followed. This depleted British reserves so quickly that the United States had to agree to the suspension of convertibility. With Britain now permitted to continue imperial preferences, it became more difficult to persuade other countries to drop their various protectionist elements. In addition the United States itself had many products it wanted to protect. The protectionists were strengthened when the Republicans won control of Congress in the 1946 elections. The result was that the compromise-filled agreement on ITO was attacked both by free traders and protectionists. The Truman administration held it back from Senate ratification since it was obvious it would be voted down. With ITO dead in the water, interest quickly shifted to GATT. While the results of the first GATT rounds in 1948-49 were rather limited, the organization was to be essential in linking Western Europe to the wider Atlantic world.¹²

The outcome of these relative American disappointments as far as the UN, the IMF, ITO, and even GATT were concerned was that Washington had to shift from a relatively global approach to a more regional one. On the regional side, no region could compare in importance with Western Europe, economically, politically, and militarily.

The United States, Germany, and the Beginnings of European Integration¹³

The United States clearly organized its sphere of influence differently from the ways other Great Powers had done; for, while they had governed through a policy of divide-and-rule, Washington actually favored the creation of a supranational Europe with its own political bodies and, accordingly, at least the possible development of an alternative political center. As the "father" of European integration Jean Monnet put it, the American insistence on European integration "is the first time in history that a great power, instead of basing its policy on ruling by dividing, has consistently and resolutely backed the creation of a large Community uniting peoples previously apart."

Washington promoted European integration in three main ways. The first, and most obvious one, was by explicitly pushing the Europeans in the direction of integration. The second and even more important was by insisting, first, on the reconstruction and, then, on the equality of the western zones of Germany

in European affairs. Nothing illustrated the crucial American role in Europe better than the fitting of emerging West Germany into the wider Western European context. How could Germany be both equal and controlled at the same time? European integration was the obvious solution. The third way in which the United States promoted European integration was through its role as Europe's ultimate arbiter or pacifier. The Europeans could undertake their integration on the premise that the United States was the ultimate pacifier in Europe in general and the guarantor against anything going seriously wrong in West Germany in particular.

Yet, at the same time, the United States clearly protected its own preeminent position, and this obvious fact was also reflected in its attitude on European integration. Two points are particularly important. First, while the United States was indeed different from other Great Powers, it did not pursue its pro-integrationist policy primarily for the sake of the West Europeans. Washington certainly thought its policy best also for them, but naturally it had its own motives for supporting an integrated Europe. None were more important than the "double" containment of Germany and the Soviet Union. Of the two, the Soviet threat was presented most explicitly—Washington's abiding concern about the role of Germany was kept much quieter, but was still striking.

Second, while the United States supported an integrated Western Europe, this was not to be an independent Europe in the sense of the "third force" often discussed, particularly on the European left. In the American perspective, the integrated Europe was always to be fitted into a wider Atlantic framework. Through this Atlantic framework, the United States would presumably be able to protect its leading role within the Western world, although this could not be absolutely guaranteed once a supranational Europe had been established. It would also be able to protect its substantial economic interests.

During and immediately after the Second World War the United States was actually largely skeptical toward European integration. The Roosevelt administration feared that such integration might lead to independent spheres of political influence and economic autarchy, and also that Germany might come to dominate an integrated Europe. When in late 1945 Washington began to modify this skepticism, the emphasis was at first on loose all-European integration in the form of the Economic Commission for Europe (ECE). The ECE included the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe and came to deal largely with minor practical matters.

With the Marshall Plan the United States came out firmly in support of Western European integration. This integration ought to be on as comprehensive a scale as possible. The Soviet Union and Communism had to be contained. The western zones of Germany had to be integrated with a revitalized Western Europe in general and with France in particular.

When the Europeans did not set up the kind of effective organization to administer the Marshall Plan assistance that the Truman administration had hoped for, they were pressured into making a new report, although even the new report proved rather disappointing from an American integrationist point of view. From 1947 to 1950 disappointment pretty much described the American reaction to what the Europeans were doing. No customs union was established, except the union between Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg (the Benelux countries), and this union was not really an American initiative. In any case, the OEEC was too weak, since the so-called free lists for trade among its members took too long to work out and there were too many reservations. Thus, although progress was made on integration, Washington thought this progress slow, much too slow.

The Truman administration clearly felt there was a lack of leadership on the European side. The natural leaders, the British, were holding back, as their relations with Western Europe had to be carefully balanced by their relations with the Commonwealth and with the United States. This applied both politically and economically. Britain's traditional distance toward the European continent was increased by the political distance between Labour ruling in Britain and more conservative forces dominating the governments on the continent. To many in Britain, not only on the left, the continent seemed to be dominated by "conservatives, capitalists, clerics, and cartels." The different war experiences were certainly relevant (with nationalism having been discredited in many quarters on the continent, but not in Britain). London's firm conclusion was that while it supported looser forms of European integration, it was entirely opposed to any form of European integration that smacked of supranationality.

At first it was even more difficult for the French than for the British to take any effective lead in promoting European integration. The temptation to exploit European integration to enhance France's international role, much damaged as a result of the Second World War, was there, but it was more than counterbalanced by other factors. French governments were many and weak, and the centrist forces that dominated these governments after 1947 in practice expected London to lead on European matters. On the crucial issue of Germany, Paris had difficulties in abandoning the course defined in 1945-6, which represented an evident continuation of the French policy after the First World War: the elimination of as much centralized power in Germany as possible, the separation of the Rhineland from the German state(s), the internationalization of the Ruhr, and the economic fusion of the Saar with France. The five-year Monnet plan for the economic modernization of France was based on German weakness in the form of inexpensive deliveries of coal from Germany to France and on France taking over traditional German markets. A poll from February 1947 revealed that only 3 per cent of the French felt

"friendly" toward the German people as compared to 42 per cent in Britain and 45 per cent in the United States.

The French thesis on Germany collided increasingly with American and British policy. In Washington and London's opinion, Germany was to be maintained as one unit; it should not be divided up. If agreement could not be secured with the Soviets, the Western zones ought to unite. Slowly the Germans were to be given the right to determine their own political affairs, first locally, then regionally, and finally nationally. The US and Britain took less and less interest in German reparations and more and more in rebuilding German industry. Thus the Western zones were incorporated into the Marshall Plan; in 1948 a currency reform was undertaken despite the problems this would present vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. Gradually the German economy was to become self-sufficient in the sense that it would not depend on supplies from abroad. After the period of occupation was over, special restrictions on West Germany sooner or later had to be lifted. In this long-term perspective the right to self-determination presumably had to include even the right to defend itself. This whole process was speeded up enormously by the Cold War. Instead of punishing and retraining the Germans, the emphasis quickly shifted to seeking their loyalty in the confrontation with the Soviet Union.

In 1947-8, once reviving Germany economically and politically became an essential part of the integration problem, the French at first became even more paralyzed. If the traditional French course had to be abandoned and Germany treated more leniently, most Frenchmen felt it much too risky to balance Germany more or less on their own. Britain had to be brought in to help in the containment of Germany. Economically, France was still rather protectionist. That protectionism helped kill both the customs union with Italy that the two agreed upon in March 1949, and the loose schemes of cooperation with Italy and the Benelux countries (Fritalux) which were being discussed.

There matters long stood, despite the increasingly Western orientation of French policy in the form of the exclusion of the Communists from the government in May 1947 and the foreign policy shift towards Washington and London after the collapse of the Council of Foreign Ministers meeting in Moscow in March-April 1947. France could cooperate with Britain in the Dunkirk defense treaty of March 1947 between the two powers; for the French in particular the treaty was in large part still directed against Germany. In fact, France would not launch a major initiative on European integration without Britain being included, but Britain simply refused to take part in any form of supranational integration.

Still, slowly the French were moving on Germany: American pressure was making the French role more and more untenable, as was the Soviet position. The Soviet Union wanted a centralized Germany; France preferred as weak a Germany as possible. The partial Soviet blockade of West Berlin from April

and the full blockade, with the exception of air corridors, from July 1948 further speeded up West Germany's rehabilitation. Washington, strongly supported by London, took the lead in organizing the response to the blockade in the form of the airlift to West Berlin. Paris played less of a role, but did support the Anglo-Saxon initiative. Clearly the West Germans had to become partners in the Cold War struggle against the Soviets; their role as the instigators of the Second World War in Europe was rapidly becoming part of history.¹⁴

In June 1948 the French national assembly accepted the London agreements which pointed the way to an independent West Germany. Prime Minister Georges Bidault persuaded the assembly that it had to choose between cooperation, including with the Western zones of Germany, and isolation. A French-American deal was clearly shaping up: France would accept the West German state if the United States committed itself more clearly to Europe. The Berlin blockade showed that the US was already doing so. Robert Schuman became French Foreign Minister in July 1948 and, with his background from Alsace-Lorraine, he had an obvious interest in Franco-German reconciliation. Schuman had strong backing from Jean Monnet who, starting in 1948, became a most ardent spokesman for European integration. Monnet was soon to become Washington's favorite European.

In part as a result of the political reconstruction of Western Germany, the French took the lead in the creation of a potentially supranational Council of Europe. But Britain, despite her strong opposition to any supranational features, was to be included in the European Council. This seemed like a vicious circle: really significant European integration could not be achieved with Britain and it could not be achieved without it. Washington was becoming increasingly frustrated by the lack of progress.

Yet, signs of change could be detected on the American side. In 1949 it was finally sinking in with the Truman administration that Britain simply would not take any lead on European integration. In fact, London became more and more Atlantic in its approach and Washington was at least in part accepting this, as illustrated most clearly by the close Anglo-American cooperation in the creation of NATO and in connection with the devaluation of the pound in September 1949. In its work to set up the European Payments Union (EPU) in 1949-50, Washington again cooperated closely with London. EPU was important in facilitating trade and exchange within Western Europe. Obviously a payments union without Britain would be much less valuable than one where it was included.

If, with the very partial exception of the EPU, Britain absolutely refused to take a constructive lead on supranational European integration, then the United States was now preparing to proceed without it. The reason for Washington's rapidly growing impatience was evident: developments in West Germany could not be put on hold. Germany had to be integrated into

a European framework and if Britain would not take the lead in establishing such a framework, others had to do it. In May 1949 the West German state was formally established. The Truman administration was insisting that the controls on Germany had to be modified and eventually lifted, and on this point the British largely supported the Americans. European integration was the obvious solution for Washington and, to a lesser extent, even for London. Britain understood that French-German reconciliation was necessary, but was held back by the conviction that it could not itself join any supranational organization.

From the American point of view something now had to be accomplished. The alternatives of, on the one hand, continuing to hold Germany down and, on the other, giving it full freedom to act were simply not acceptable. France should agree to give the West Germans more independence in their political affairs and also take the lead in bringing Germany into all relevant international organizations. To do otherwise would be to weaken the democratic forces in Germany and strengthen extremism and the Soviet position there.

Washington's sympathy for London remained strong, however. In April 1950 a State Department position paper once again concluded that "No other country has the same qualifications for being our principal ally and partner as the UK." The US could find "its most important collaborators and allies in the UK and the Commonwealth, just as the UK and the Commonwealth are, in turn, dependent upon us." Partly on account of these very sympathies, American policymakers just could not bring themselves to give up entirely on Britain taking some sort of lead on European integration. The problem of course was that no British leadership was emerging. As we shall see in the next chapter, Paris finally responded in the form of the Schuman plan for a European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC).

"Empire" by Invitation: The Economic and Political Sides¹⁵

For centuries the European Great Powers had dominated international diplomacy. In 1945 their situation was dramatically different. Germany and Italy had been defeated; France was discredited because of its war record; Britain close to being bankrupt. The signs were strong that the European colonial empires would have to be reformed and, quite likely, scaled back. No one foresaw the pace that decolonization would actually come to take. The United States and the Soviet Union were emerging as the two leading powers, exerting overwhelming influence in their respective parts of Europe.

While the United States emerged as the world's main creditor after the First World War, both Britain and France were at that time still creditor states, but after the Second World War the United States was virtually the only major

source of credit. (Canada and Sweden represented much smaller sources.) Practically every Western European country, certainly including Britain and France, wanted fresh economic assistance from the US, in this case from the government. (The more limited American credits extended after the First World War came largely from private banks.)

Britain was, as a matter of course, included as one of the world's three "superpowers." History certainly strengthened Britain's role; the fact that in 1945 Britain was still formally controlling almost 25 per cent of the world's population was important. So, most definitely, was Britain's distinguished war record, as was Winston Churchill's wartime leadership and his participation in the summits at Teheran, Yalta, and Potsdam.

But in July 1945 the British voters chose Clement Attlee's Labour over Churchill's Conservatives. The election symbolized a greater attention to domestic over foreign affairs. Britain's economic situation was difficult. Production was holding up surprisingly well; the balance of payments situation was critical, however. In 1945 Britain was spending abroad more than 2,000 million pounds and was earning about 350 million. The export trade had been halved and exports were paying for less than a fifth of imports. The income from foreign investment, which had meant so much for Britain's historic balance of payments, had been cut in half. Overseas assets of more than one billion pounds had been sold to finance the war or they had simply been lost.¹⁶

While the Attlee government understood that Britain was facing great economic and political challenges, it faced the future with surprising optimism. Britain had important assets; first, there was the Commonwealth; then Britain was seeing itself, and was being perceived by most West European governments, as the leader of Western Europe, and while Britain would not enter into any form of *supranational* European integration, it was prepared to promote institutions that were clearly based on *intergovernmental* cooperation. This was seen in the Dunkirk treaty with France, in the British fleshing out of the ideas presented on the American side with the Marshall Plan, in the establishment of the Western Union with France and the Benelux countries in 1948 and the Council of Europe in 1949, and in Foreign Office ideas about a European customs union, ideas which, however, were quickly shot down by the economic ministries in London.

Finally, there was the "special relationship" with the United States. The Attlee government was afraid of becoming too dependent on the US: the Americans were given to wild swings in their foreign policy, their judgement was not to be entirely trusted. When Britain in 1947 decided to develop its own atomic bomb, after Congress through the McMahon Act had abandoned the wartime understanding about a joint American-British development, this decision was in part meant to give Britain greater leverage, even vis-à-vis the United States.

Still, there could be no doubt about the British desire to involve the United States in the affairs of Western Europe. In fact, no country expressed Europe's attitude of inviting, even urging the Americans to abandon their isolationism and play an active part in Europe's affairs as clearly as did Britain. The invitations could be seen in many different ways: Whitehall expressed disappointment when wartime Lend-Lease was abruptly curtailed; hoped for a credit substantially larger than the 3.75 billion dollars it actually received; wanted to continue wartime cooperation in atomic energy and the existence of at least some of the combined Anglo-American boards, particularly the Combined Chiefs of Staff and encouraged the United States to carry a larger share of the expenses of the German Bizone (the unified US and UK zones).

The Europeans, and particularly the British, also played an important part in shaping the Marshall Plan. The crucial person here was Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin. Although the Americans were skeptical of working through the ECE and thus of having the Soviets participate, Washington left much of the follow-up to Marshall's Harvard speech on 5 June 1947 to the British (and the French). In the ensuing British-French-Soviet conference in Paris, Bevin dominated the scene. The Soviet attempt to substitute a bilateral approach for the multilateral one favored by Washington was rejected. The ECE was to be bypassed and the Russians were to be left out.

Despite the initial optimism, in 1946-9 the British position was more or less collapsing in several different parts of the world. In most of these cases Britain wanted the United States to take up the British burden so that economic and political vacuums did not arise. The US was surprisingly willing to assume these new commitments. In May 1946 Bevin presented a paper to the Cabinet proposing that the British zone in Germany be consolidated with the other Western zones into a single economic unit. The paper was not formally adopted, being seen as somewhat too anti-Soviet. In addition, "the Americans are probably not ready for this" and "full American support would be essential." Britain was well ahead of the United States in reconstructing its zone in Germany economically and politically. London simply could not afford to be supporting Germany financially to avoid starvation and chaos there, when Britain itself was facing serious economic problems. The British "would be compelled to organize the British Zone... in such a manner that no further liability shall fall on the British taxpayer." So, when Secretary of State James Byrnes on 11 July offered to join the American zone with that of any other occupying power, Britain was more than ready.¹⁷ The Bizone was established.

What really brought matters to a head was the extreme winter of 1947, the worst in Britain since 1881. In January 1947 manufacturing output declined well below production figures for the fall of 1946; in February output fell another 25 per cent. This immediate background, combined with the general

perspective already outlined, led directly to the decision to abandon India and Palestine as quickly as possible and to terminate aid to Greece and Turkey.

India and Pakistan were to become fully independent, as had long been obvious. This was clearly in accordance with American desires. As Robinson and Louis have argued, the entire British approach to decolonization after the war was in considerable measure influenced by the American skepticism to colonialism.¹⁸ In Palestine the British-American relationship was much more competitive and the British initially responded quite negatively to the American pressure to pull out. Still, facing the hostility of both Arabs and Jews, Britain's position was untenable, and in 1948 it pulled out of Palestine. Israel and Jordan were established (and numerous Palestinian refugee camps).

Greece and Turkey, like Germany, illustrated the invitational aspect of British policy. Throughout 1946 Washington had strengthened its role in the Eastern Mediterranean-Near East, from the decision to haul the Soviet Union before the UN Security Council for its failure to withdraw from Northern Iran to the increased presence of the American 6th Fleet in the Mediterranean. The British notes of 21 February 1947 to Washington really represented an invitation to have the US take over the traditional British role of protecting Greece and Turkey against Russia/the Soviet Union. The State Department officials who received the notes on Greece and Turkey realized at once "that Great Britain had within the hour handed the job of world leadership, with all its burdens and all its glory, to the United States."¹⁹ The British financial situation was desperate. Still, the British decision to pull out was probably in part presented in the dramatic way it was to enhance the chance of the United States responding positively. Thus, some British troops actually stayed on in Greece beyond the announced deadline of 31 March by which they were to be withdrawn.

After it became evident that the British had to scale down their commitments to Greece and Turkey dramatically, these two countries were to press even harder than they had already done for the maximum American support available. The formal American reply finally came in the form of the Truman Doctrine, which concretely meant 400 million dollars in economic and military assistance to Greece and Turkey, 300 million going to Greece where both the economic and military needs were the most pressing.²⁰

While Britain worked especially hard to involve the United States in the affairs of Europe, France actually did the same, but in a more indirect and implicit way. France's starting point in 1944-5 was that it had suffered a major defeat in 1940 and that its honor and prestige had to be resurrected as soon as possible. This goal was most clearly formulated by Charles de Gaulle, President of the provisional government, but it was taken over by later governments when he resigned in January 1946. During the war the relationship between de Gaulle and Washington had been strained. Only on 11 July 1944

in connection with his visit to Washington was de Gaulle's government recognized as the de facto government of France. De Gaulle returned convinced that Franklin Roosevelt's conceptions were "grandiose, as well as disquieting for Europe and France," since FDR obviously intended to relegate France from the league of Great Powers.²¹

France's weak position was somewhat improved by Britain's desire for a continental partner. It was largely thanks to Churchill's efforts at Yalta that France was granted a zone in Germany. The Franco-Soviet treaty of 10 December 1944 was an attempt to continue the traditional French policy of alliance-building in the east against Germany. The Soviet Union could also provide some leverage vis-à-vis "les Anglo-Saxons." It was even useful domestically since the Communist party (PCF) was strong and well organized. In fact, at its height in 1946, the PCF secured almost 29 per cent of the vote. The Franco-Soviet alliance proved a disappointment, however. The Soviet Union did not support the French position either on Rhineland-Ruhr or on central organs for Germany; Soviet policies in Eastern Europe quickly proved to be more suppressive than de Gaulle had foreseen; cooperation with the PCF became increasingly difficult until in May 1947 they were expelled from the government.

In the short run the emphasis was on American economic support to France. As in London, Paris quickly concluded that there was only one major source of credit and assistance, the United States. The Blum-Byrnes Accords of May 1946 effectively extinguished the French Lend-Lease debt of over 2 billion dollars and gave the French credits of more than 750 million dollars. In the wake of Marshall's June 1947 initiative Foreign Minister Georges Bidault provided surprisingly strong support to the firm line Bevin was taking against Soviet ideas of how to organize the Marshall Plan. Since the plan would only be effective from April 1948, France, like Germany, Italy, and Austria, was granted interim aid to help it through the short-term crisis. France received 284 million dollars in such assistance. These three programs of economic assistance were all important for the implementation of the Monnet plan for France's modernization, based as it was on support from the United States and a break with traditional French protectionism. Paris's major complaint was that the support was just too limited. At his most optimistic Monnet had even dreamed of a 3.5 billion dollar credit.

In 1944-5 the United States had emphasized the need for broad coalitions in Western Europe to tackle the huge economic and political problems facing the continent. These coalitions might well include the Communist party. In 1946-7 Washington's attitude changed; it became obvious that Washington wanted the Communist parties out of these coalitions. This change of attitude coincided with rapidly rising tension within the coalitions themselves. In some countries, Italy being the best example, Washington actively encouraged the

non-Communists to break with the Communists. Secretary Marshall made it clear that an Italian government without Communists would meet with a more positive response financially than one with Communists. In France the parallel resignation of the Communists appears to have been largely domestically driven, but again it was obvious that the reformed government would meet with a positive response in Washington. In 1947-8 the newly founded Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) cooperated with the American Federation of Labor in forming alternatives to the Communist-led unions in France and Italy. In the crucial Italian elections in April 1948 the CIA spent at least ten million dollars in a successful effort to defeat the Communist party. Most of the money went to the Christian Democrats, less to the Republicans and the Social Democrats.

The US not only wanted to keep the Communists and socialist leftists, like the Nenni Socialists in Italy, out; it was also skeptical about the inclusion of the far right, both in the form of fascism and even of de Gaulle's rightist nationalism. It was another matter that once the United States started to promote centrist governments, these in turn had considerable leverage with the US since the alternatives were so clearly disagreeable to Washington. In fact, the weaker they were, the more leverage they sometimes had.

Elsewhere on the European continent, from the wartime years to the signing of the North Atlantic treaty, the Dutch in particular followed a consistently Atlanticist policy emphasizing the role of the United States, and they did so despite the bitter American-Dutch feud over Indonesia.²² The Italian governments, particularly under Christian Democrat Alcide de Gasperi, were pressing hard for American assistance—from the negotiations over the terms of Italy's peace treaty to humanitarian assistance and the Marshall Plan and interim aid. It was another matter that particularly in the early years the United States did not deliver in the way the Italians had hoped: like London and Paris, Rome received much less credit than it had dreamed of, 100 million dollars as opposed to the 940 million initially requested. Italy had after all been on the Axis side during most of the Second World War. Even the intense efforts of the Italian government, the Catholic Church, and the Italian-American lobby could not entirely overcome this embarrassing fact of history.²³

In the period from July 1945 through June 1947 Western Europe in fact on a yearly average received a slightly larger amount of assistance than it did through the Marshall Plan, 8.3 billion dollars from 1945 to 1947 in bilateral form versus 14.1 billion through the four-year multilateral Marshall Plan. And this does not take into account the more than three billion dollars that the Western Europeans received in humanitarian aid in the first two years after the war. All other forms added up, in 1945-7 Britain's share alone was 4.4 billion dollars. France received 1.9 billion, Italy 330 million, the Benelux countries

430 million. In this period Eastern Europe got a total of 546 million. The Eastern Europeans, certainly including the Soviets, were interested in much more, but for political and economic reasons Washington refused. Cold War considerations were rapidly becoming decisive.

Under the Marshall Plan the Europeans first requested 28 billion dollars from the United States. This was much more than Washington was willing to give. The Truman administration cut this down to 17 billion and Congress in turn appropriated 14 billion. Most European countries fought long and hard for as large grants and loans as possible. Socialist Norway was probably the only country that consciously limited the amount it applied for, in an effort to reduce dependence on "capitalist" America. It soon reversed its policy, however. Only Moscow's opposition prevented Finland, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and even other Eastern European countries from taking part in the Marshall Plan. Washington's own attitude blocked the participation of Franco's Spain, the only country formally excluded from the very beginning. So, at least on the economic side, there can be no doubt that the Europeans were most interested in involving the United States closely in Europe's affairs.

~ "Empire" by Invitation: The Military Side²⁴

Contrary to what especially revisionist historians on the American side of the Atlantic have so frequently written, most of the initiatives leading to the creation of NATO were taken in Western Europe, not in Washington. In late 1947 to early 1948 the European interest in any "third force" standing between the United States and the Soviet Union was rapidly disappearing. The international climate in particular, but also the domestic situation in many countries, forced governments to make a clear choice between the two emerging blocs, East and West.

In fact, in 1945-6 the main antagonists were Britain and the Soviet Union, not the United States and the Soviet Union. In this respect it made virtually no difference that in the middle of the Potsdam Conference power in London was transferred from Churchill and the Conservatives to Attlee and Labour. In 1944-5 the British chiefs of staff and even the Foreign Office were clearly less optimistic than their American counterparts about the possibilities of continued cooperation with the Soviet Union once the Second World War was over. At Yalta Roosevelt repeatedly made comments at Churchill's expense in an effort to establish himself in some sort of middle position between the two antagonists; Truman did less of this at Potsdam, but the political distance was still even greater between London and Moscow than between Washington and Moscow. At the Council of Foreign Ministers meetings in London and Moscow in late 1945, Secretary of State James Byrnes was the one trying to

find the compromises, although he met with a negative reaction from Truman after Moscow. Soviet propaganda clearly distinguished between Britain, with its "reactionary" social democratic government as the chief obstacle to "peace," and the United States. British imperialism, not American capitalism, was primary the target of attacks from the Kremlin.

Only gradually in 1946 did British and American policies become more unified. By the end of 1946 the Foreign Office was finally happy. The main reason for this happiness was

the reaction of the United States... to the continued expansionist policy pursued by the Soviet Union... a movement in American public opinion which by the end of the year had substituted for any previous tendency to appease the Soviet Union a determination to oppose her further advance and the extension of Communist influence at every point on the borderland between the Soviet and the Anglo-American zones of influence.²⁵

Many forms of military and intelligence cooperation actually did continue between the United States and Britain after the war. The British would have preferred such cooperation to have been undertaken openly, but that was deemed politically impossible in Washington. When the Truman administration balked at certain forms of intelligence cooperation, the Attlee government still continued to provide intelligence unilaterally to the US until Washington in 1946-7 again decided to reciprocate fully. For a short while it was even possible to continue the joint wartime effort in the nuclear field, until Congress decided to put a stop to this, much to Britain's chagrin.

In Britain Bevin conducted a virtual campaign to involve the United States in an Atlantic security system. He made his first presentation to Marshall after the meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers in December 1947. The emphasis was still on defense cooperation between Britain, France, and the Benelux countries, but this group had to be linked to the United States. Bevin presented these ideas in a letter to Marshall before he made his public presentation in the House of Commons on 22 January 1948. On 27 January Bevin requested informal talks between the United States and Britain on the topic of Western security. His objective was obvious: the Western European treaties that were being proposed "cannot be fully effective nor be relied upon when a crisis arises unless there is assurance of American support for the defense of Western Europe. The plain truth is that Western Europe cannot yet stand on its own feet without assurance of support."

Washington was receptive to Bevin's objective of organizing Europe's defense, but remained non-committal on the ways in which the United States would support this system. Bevin felt that a vicious circle was being created. The United States would not define its position before the European arrangement had been agreed upon. The British argued that an arrangement could not

be worked out at all without American participation since the Western Europeans would see little point in a purely European approach.

There matters remained until 12 March when Marshall notified London that "we are prepared to proceed at once in the joint discussions on the establishment of an Atlantic security system." Thus, negotiations could be started right away, and the security system was to be *Atlantic*; no longer was the emphasis on the United States simply supporting a Western European treaty.

I have argued elsewhere that a series of events explain this dramatic change of attitude in Washington: the crisis in Czechoslovakia which led to the full control of Soviet-oriented elements; the Soviet proposal to Finland for a defense agreement between the two countries; General Lucius Clay's warning from Germany about Soviet intentions there; but, most of all and largely neglected in the later literature, the rumors that the Soviets might be presenting a pact proposal not only to Finland, but even to Norway. On 11 March Bevin again used dramatic language to attract the attention of the Americans:

all possible steps should be taken to forestall a Norwegian defection at this time, which would involve the appearance of Russia on the Atlantic and the collapse of the whole Scandinavian system. This would in turn prejudice the chance of calling any halt to the relentless advance of Russia into Western Europe.²⁶

Although de Gaulle's and other French governments in 1945-7 refused publicly to take sides in the emerging Cold War and instead stressed France's independent role, privately it was obvious that they had an active interest in strengthening the American presence in Europe. In a note written as early as April 1945 the general insisted that one should "link in the future the United States with the security of the European continent and establish through their presence the conditions of a necessary balance of power in Europe." The French General Staff soon started secret planning for a Western European defense with American support.²⁷

In 1946-7 the French soundings for America's support in case of a crisis were tied to the name of Pierre Billotte, first deputy chief of staff, then a member of the French delegation at the UN, and with excellent connections both to de Gaulle and Bidault. The ultimate ambition of those behind Billotte was to establish some sort of joint American-French defense against the Soviet Union, but since this objective was not shared by the neutralists and the Communists in the government the soundings could only go so far.

With the Communists out of the government, the defeat of the French thesis in Germany, and the growing East-West tension, in December 1947 Atlanticist Foreign Minister Georges Bidault received the authorization of the Cabinet to start talks with the United States, Great Britain, and the Benelux countries to achieve some sort of joint military organization. The objective was to get the Americans to conclude a secret military agreement for the

defense of Western Europe. This led to clandestine conversations near New York between generals Billotte, Ridgway (US), and Morgan (UK).²⁸

On 4 March 1948 Bidault requested Washington "to strengthen in the political field, and as soon as possible in the military one, the collaboration between the old and the new worlds, both so jointly responsible for the preservation of the only valuable civilization." The British and the French perspectives were somewhat at a variance, with London emphasizing the wider Atlantic structure and Paris primarily military assistance and a security guarantee directly to France. In any wider set-up Paris wanted a leadership role on a par with Washington and London. With France not being represented in the US-UK-Canada talks on Atlantic security in March-April, this was to lead to considerable confusion. Yet, the result of London and Paris's policies was the same: strong invitations to the United States to become more involved in Europe, even militarily.

Similar invitations were issued also by other Western European countries. None had contacts with the United States as close as those of Britain; few combined clear-cut realism about the true state of affairs with such public skepticism towards the United States as did France. The Netherlands was also Atlanticist in its military approach and wanted American involvement to be strong and direct. Belgium preferred a dumb-bell-like relationship, with roughly equal partners on both sides of the Atlantic, and not a Western Europe dominated by the United States. This was not to be. The dumb-bell concept had support only from a minority in Washington; the British were instrumental in concluding the Brussels treaty of March 1948 which created the Western Union, but more and more the point had become to bring the Americans in as strongly as possible; even the French were ambivalent since a European organization would be led by Britain and could thereby limit direct French contacts with the United States.

For the United States it was important to widen membership in the Atlantic security system beyond the Brussels treaty members Britain, France, and the Benelux countries, in addition to the United States and Canada. (Canada played an important and frequently overlooked role in creating the Atlantic system that was to be NATO.) The "stepping-stones" for communication between North America and Europe were particularly important strategically. Thus, Washington pushed strongly for the membership of Portugal (the Azores), Iceland, Denmark (Greenland), and Norway.

Norway, Denmark, and Iceland would actually have preferred their military ties with the United States to have been more limited than they became. In the summer of 1947 they had all joined the Marshall Plan together with Sweden, Norway rather reluctantly. In 1948 their overall orientation was becoming increasingly Western, but there was still the urge to see whether a Scandinavian military solution could not be found. Norway and Denmark negotiated with

Sweden to set up a security system with only modest ties with the US. The major issue between increasingly Western-leaning Norway and neutralist Sweden, with Denmark in the middle, was exactly what these ties were to be. When a Scandinavian system with minimal ties to the West could not be agreed among the three, Norway chose NATO. Its decision in turn influenced Denmark and Iceland to do the same.²⁹

Scandinavia's hesitation was not typical for Western Europe, however. In Italy, despite the opposition of the left—and even of the right—the predominant center, strongly urged on by Ambassador Tarchiani in Washington, pushed for membership. Membership would show that the country had become a fully accepted part of the West. The United States and Britain were rather skeptical about the inclusion of a former Axis country unwashed by the Atlantic Ocean, but in the end the French were able to bring Italy in, in part to compensate for the American insistence on the three Nordic states in the north.³⁰ Authoritarian Portugal, with the crucial base in the Azores, was very pleased to be accepted into such good company. Spain, Greece, and Turkey all wanted to join NATO, but they were not permitted to do so in this round. Ireland would have been welcome as a member, but the conflict with Britain over Northern Ireland prevented any such development.

In the negotiations to set up NATO virtually every European country wanted to make the American military commitment to Europe as automatic as possible. For many that was the whole point of NATO. The State Department thus had to mediate between the Western Europeans on the one hand and a Congress on the other that under no circumstances would give the Europeans the right to declare war on behalf of the United States. In the end the crucial Article 5 of the treaty simply stated that in the case of an attack each of the parties would take "such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area."

Western Europe's pressure for closer American involvement in its military affairs did not end with the setting up of NATO. Thus, at the first session of the Council of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in September 1949 the question of NATO's further organization was discussed. A Defense Committee, a Military Committee, and a Standing Group, the last composed of one representative each of the US, the UK, and France, were established. Five Regional Planning Groups were also created. Crucial in this context was pressure from practically all the European states to have the United States as a member of their particular regional group. This was the case within the Western Europe group consisting of the Brussels treaty countries, the Northern Europe group of Norway, Denmark, and Britain, and the Southern Europe group of France, Italy, and Britain. The result was that the United States became a full member of the North Atlantic Ocean Regional Planning Group and the Canada-United States Regional Planning Group and only

a "consulting member" of the other three. As the report of the NATO Council stated with regard to the three regional groups, "The United States had been requested and has agreed to participate actively in the defense planning as appropriate."

The European pressure was to a large extent continued also after the outbreak of the Korean War, but the definition of what was "appropriate" changed dramatically. Now the Europeans worked hard to establish an integrated NATO force in Europe commanded by an American general. The Europeans were unanimous in their preference for General Dwight D. Eisenhower, who was duly selected by Truman. Four additional US divisions were sent to Europe to reduce European fears that the outbreak of the Korean War might be only the prelude to a much bigger conflict in Europe. While the number of US military personnel in Europe stood at 80,000 in 1950, the lowest number after 1945, it increased to 244,000 in 1953.³¹ American military assistance to Europe also increased greatly. Even Norway, which did not permit the stationing of foreign troops on its soil, worked hard and with some success to "nail" the US to Northern Europe and particularly to get "a hook in the nose of the US Air Force."³²

As we shall see, the Europeans in return had to agree to West German rearmament. They also agreed to increase their own military forces and defense budgets considerably, but here we come to one element that was to trouble the alliance time and again: once the Americans had increased their commitment to NATO, this tended to reduce the inducement for the Europeans to do their part. The American objective of increasing Europe's own defense efforts therefore met with only partial success.

Invitations and the State of Public Opinion³³

Thus, the pressure from European governments was undoubtedly in the direction of more, not less, American attention to Europe. The question should be raised about the extent to which the governments represented their peoples on this point.

It is difficult to give one clear answer. The situation varied from country to country and polls are not available for all of them, entirely satisfactory polls for hardly any of them. In occupied Germany, Italy, and Austria, in dictatorships such as Spain and Portugal, in civil war-plagued Greece, and in Turkey as well it was difficult to talk about public opinion. The growing American support to all these countries, from 1950 to 1951 even including Spain, clearly showed that in the containment of the Soviet Union Washington was not afraid of cooperating with undemocratic forces. Conversely, the popular basis of the Czechoslovak government did not prevent the Truman administration from

breaking with it in the fall of 1946. Increasingly anti-Communism counted even more than democratic sympathies, although a combination of both was naturally to be preferred. In Western Europe, different from so many other parts of the world, Washington could frequently have the best of both worlds.

Britain, France, and West Germany were the most important countries. In Britain, the Attlee government received the support of strong majorities for its US policies. In January 1946, 70 per cent thought Britain should accept a loan from America, while 17 per cent said no. In April 1948, 63 per cent favored the government's general attitude toward the US, while 19 per cent disapproved of it. In July 1947, 22 per cent had stated that they thought the United States wanted to dominate the world, but this declined to 14 per cent in July 1948 and to 4 per cent in August 1950. (The corresponding percentages for Soviet domination were 78, 70, and 63.) It is a different matter that the British, not surprisingly, did not want the United States to run British affairs and that strong minorities disliked certain aspects of America's foreign policy. The basic feeling was that the two countries should act together, but that Britain should definitely remain independent of the United States.

The picture was more ambiguous in France, although there too sympathy for the United States prevailed. In July 1945 the United States was only favored 43 to 41 per cent over the Soviet Union in reply to the question of what country would have the greatest influence after the war. Yet, the US was picked by 47 to 23 per cent for the Soviet Union when it came to whom the French would *prefer* to see in this influential position. The doubt as to who would actually dominate lingered on until the spring of 1947, but there was less doubt about popular preferences. Pluralities supported the American loan of 1946, French participation in the Marshall Plan, and France joining the Atlantic pact, although the number of uncommitted/uninformed persons was frequently surprisingly high.

In West Germany much criticism could be found of various aspects of the occupation, but at least in the American zone the sympathy for the United States was much stronger than for the other occupying powers. In October 1947, 63 per cent trusted the US to treat Germany fairly, 45 per cent placed such trust in Britain, 4 per cent in France, and 0 per cent in the Soviet Union. The support for the Marshall Plan was pronounced; the same was true for the creation of a government for the three Western zones. The West German population sustained America's actions, but the United States did not pursue the policies it did primarily for the sake of public opinion. The relationship was succinctly expressed by the editors of the official OMGUS (Office of the Military Government in the US Zone) Survey: "The existence of a population that was receptive to reorientation . . . enhanced the Allies' opportunity to help shape German history."

In comparative polls from August 1947 and February 1948, no country showed such skepticism toward the United States as did Norway. Here, in

February, 23 per cent thought the US would go to war to achieve its goals and not only to defend itself against attack. (37 per cent responded that the Soviet Union would do so.) This was higher than in France (20 per cent), Holland (16), Italy (16), Sweden (13), Canada (13), Brazil (9), and the United States itself (5). This reflected traditional Norwegian feelings of distance to virtually all Great Powers. Yet, only two months later 61 per cent thought Norway should join a Western bloc (the US role in this bloc was not clear), 2 per cent favored an Eastern bloc, while 37 per cent thought Norway ought to remain uncommitted. A majority also supported the decision to join NATO, at least after it had been made. The perception of a dramatic increase in the threat from the Soviet Union and the strong campaign of the Gerhardsen Labor government for Norway to join NATO changed Norwegian public opinion dramatically.

Thus, little indicates that the European political leaders did not receive the tacit or even explicit support of their peoples when they brought their countries into closer economic, political, and military cooperation with the United States.

Why the European Invitations? Did They Determine US policy?

It is no mystery why the Europeans invited the Americans in. In fact, the reasons were rather obvious. First, as we have seen, Western Europe needed economic assistance and only the United States could provide it substantially. Second, the forces of the political center in most Western European countries wanted American support to strengthen their position, both domestically vis-à-vis the more extreme forces on the left and right and often also internationally vis-à-vis other countries. The challenge from the left was strongest in France and Italy where the Communists and their allies regularly polled 25-30 per cent of the vote. The challenge from the right was also strongest in France, although the Gaullist vote fluctuated a great deal. Internationally, Alessandro Brogi has demonstrated how a complicated mixture of cooperation with the United States and independence from it characterized both France's constant search for *grandeur* and even Italy's for *grandezza*. Washington had it in its power to promote or relegate countries in their constant struggle for prestige and status.³⁴ Third, the Europeans wanted as much military support and as strong military guarantees as possible to guard against Soviet-Communist expansion. Although Washington had no particular desire to give Europe billions of dollars in assistance, it definitely shared its desire to contain the Soviet-Communist threat.

The Western Europeans invited the Americans into Europe despite the conditions set by Washington, whether in the form of currency convertibility, as in the December 1945 loan to Britain; the freer import of Hollywood movies, as in the Blum-Byrnes Accords; or special shipping clauses, as in most

American loans to Western Europe. Under the Marshall Plan the Europeans had to agree to a stronger OEEC organization than some of them had wanted, to a more restrictive level of trade between Western and Eastern Europe, etc.

On the military side most European governments wanted a substantial American military presence. This presence could certainly expose them to risks. Yet, even when the initiative came from Washington, as with the US B-29 bombers stationed in Britain in response to the Berlin crisis in 1948, the British agreed so quickly and uncompromisingly that Marshall had to check with Bevin if London had actually fully considered the implications. (Only later did it become publicly known that the aircraft had not yet been modified to carry nuclear weapons.)³⁵

For the Europeans there was always the possibility that they would be overwhelmed by the formidable power of the United States. However, one reason why they so confidently invited the Americans in was that the Europeans were consistently able to transform US initiatives into something less threatening than they might have seemed at first. True, the price might still be high, as in the American-British loan negotiations; but if it were too high, reality would interfere, as when the collapse of the pound led to the suspension of the convertibility London had promised.

In the Marshall Plan negotiations the British fairly successfully opposed the American efforts to make the OEEC truly supranational; they could not be forced to take part in European integration, then or later. Britain was simply too strong, too important, and too highly considered in Washington to be directly pushed into such responsibilities. The Scandinavians and other lukewarm integrationists could then hide behind the British.

Under the Marshall Plan the counterpart funds seemingly provided the best leverage for the Truman administration. Each government had to deposit local currency funds equal to the amount of dollar assistance received, and these counterpart funds could only be used with the consent of the United States. In Germany, Austria, Turkey, and Greece the Missions of the Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA) did exert a great deal of authority. But too much should not be made of this: Germany and Austria were occupied countries where naturally the occupying power would exert a great deal of authority; in Greece and Turkey local administrations had broken down to such an extent that here too the US would be rather directly involved in running the countries. These were rather different circumstances from those prevailing in most other Marshall Plan countries.

In Britain and Norway the counterpart funds were generally used for debt retirement, a fact that obviously gave the ECA little influence on where the money was invested. Certain concessions were gradually made to the ECA representatives' wish for a more investment-oriented policy, but the two countries were still able to continue their basic policies. In Italy the government

also invested too little, in the opinion of ECA; thus, counterpart funds were held back to make the Italians perform better with some, albeit limited, success. In France ECA's complaints were the opposite: the Monnet plan was too ambitious. In addition, fiscal reform was consistently postponed, Communists not purged, etc. Elaborate plans were drawn up to make Paris follow American desires, again with only limited success. In the end the Truman administration was caught between a rock and a hard place: if it did not push hard, the French, and the Italians, would do little or nothing; if it pushed hard, weak centrist governments might fall and that was clearly even less acceptable to the US. In the flood of new American ideas and proposals to reform the European economies, the Europeans were frequently able to pick those they liked and reject those they liked less.³⁶

The story was rather similar when it came to American efforts to limit trade with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe. In December 1947 the Truman administration initiated a strategic embargo on trade in certain products with these countries (the A-1 list composed of military commodities and the B-1 list containing semi-strategic or "dual purpose" goods). In the summer of 1948 Washington started work on having these lists adopted by the ERP countries. A permanent coordinating committee (CoCom) was set up to monitor trade with the Communist countries. The American position was soon strengthened by the increased international tension as a result of the Communist victory in the Chinese civil war, the Soviet explosion of the atomic bomb, and the outbreak of the Korean War. Nevertheless, with Britain in the lead, egged on especially by Denmark and Norway, the Western Europeans were able to substantially modify both the A-1 and, particularly, the B-1 list to take account of European economic interests. One reason they succeeded as well as they did was that after 1952 president Dwight D. Eisenhower clearly saw himself in a middle position between most Europeans on the one hand and Congress in particular on the other.³⁷

On the military side, the increases in European defense spending were generally smaller than Washington would have preferred. The European governments had their own interest in increasing defense expenditures, but the optimal combination was one of the Americans spending rather more and the Europeans rather less. Those countries that were skeptical toward an explicit American presence, such as exposed Norway and Denmark, could pursue their policy of no allied bases on their territory (except in crucial Greenland in Denmark's case). Initially, at least, this was done with considerable sympathy from a Washington that understood their special needs. Thus, all European governments seemingly had some leverage with the United States: strong governments had this because they were strong; weak governments had it exactly because they were weak, often so weak that they risked being replaced by alternatives considerably less to Washington's liking.

It is arguments such as these that have made Alan Milward and others argue not only that the Marshall Plan was not particularly important for the recovery of Western Europe, but also that the American design for Western Europe was largely defeated.³⁸ Similar comments have been made about some of the other American initiatives discussed.

Yet, these arguments go only so far. To take the Marshall Plan, for example, Milward probably underestimates the economic importance of the Plan somewhat, for, with the exception of agriculture, the ERP actually reached or surpassed all its major production targets. The direct economic significance of the Marshall Plan was considerable, although it certainly did not "save" Western Europe single-handedly: Marshall funds accounted for 10 to 20 per cent of capital formation in the European countries in 1948-9 and less than 10 per cent in 1950-1.³⁹

Milward definitely underestimates the Plan's political and psychological importance. Many actually believed it had saved Western Europe. Then this belief developed a reality of its own. The Marshall Plan also changed European perceptions of the United States in a more positive direction. George Kennan may have gone too far, but he was certainly on to something when he stated that "The psychological success at the outset was so amazing that we felt that the psychological effect was four-fifths accomplished before the first supplies arrived."⁴⁰ Even more important in this context is the point that, although the Truman administration definitely did not reach its maximum objectives, European governments always had to keep at least one eye on Washington's response to the policies they pursued. Thus, in May 1949 the British Cabinet even feared that "increased investments in the social services might influence Congress in their appropriations from Marshall aid."⁴¹

At the more structural level, despite certain shortcomings the political success of the ERP was still spectacular. It helped achieve political stabilization in Western Europe, externally vis-à-vis the Soviet Union and internally vis-à-vis local Communists; it promoted some measure of European integration; it made the Western zones of Germany part of this stabilization and integration; it changed European perceptions of the United States dramatically for the better, from Washington's point of view; it mobilized the American public around a comprehensive US role in Europe. On this level the success of the Truman administration could be seen as astounding. The same basic argument can be made with relevance to NATO.

Naturally, for the Europeans nothing beat having the United States involved without the Americans exerting much influence on national policies. Yet, eating one's cake and having it too is an impossible combination, in international politics as in any other area of life. The United States would not have become involved in European politics after 1945 to the extent it did unless

Washington had had its own reasons to do so *and* the Europeans had wanted this to happen. Agreements between free governments presuppose a mutuality of interests: otherwise the agreements presumably would not have been concluded.

On the invitation side, it has been argued that the invitations did not really *determine* US foreign policy. America's foreign policy was determined primarily by America's own interests, not by the invitations from the outside. This point is obviously true, so true in fact that I have made this explicitly clear myself: "I just take it for granted that the United States had important strategic, political, and economic motives of its own for taking on such a comprehensive world role."⁴² Indeed, the invitations had to be combined with America's own interests. After 1945 the European invitations were extended to a United States disposed to respond in a much more affirmative way than it had done in 1918-20.

At the same time, however, it should be stressed that the European invitations after the Second World War were definitely more insistent, lasted longer, and came from many more countries than on the earlier occasion. While little is really known about the state of public opinion in Europe after the First World War, if we are to generalize about public opinion after the Second, we may say that the invitations extended to the United States by most Western European governments clearly came to receive the basic support of the populations involved.

In the perspective of American-European relations it is certainly crucial to study the European response to the new role for the United States after 1945, even if the response had little or no effect on America's actions. Yet, the invitations definitely did have an effect. Obviously there would not have been any economic assistance if the Europeans had not wanted it. Considering Washington's initially lukewarm response to Bevin's pleas for an Atlantic security system, it seems likely that the setting up of NATO would at least have been substantially delayed if it had not been for the European invitations. The heart of NATO, Article 5, would probably not have had even its semi-automatic form if the Europeans had not pushed as hard as they did for an even more automatic American response to potential Soviet aggression.

The experience after the First World War indicates that European invitations alone were not enough to change America's attitude, although it is not really possible to tell what would have happened if the invitations then had been as insistent, lasted as long, and come from as many countries as they did after the Second World War. After 1945, with the United States determined to play a much more active role, the invitations did not force the Americans to do anything they did not really want to do, but they certainly influenced at least the timing and scope of America's actions toward Western Europe.

Notes

1. This section largely follows my *The American Empire and Other Studies of US Foreign Policy in a Comparative Perspective* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990), 39–46.
2. Laski is quoted in Norman Graebner, *America as a World Power: A Realist Appraisal from Wilson to Reagan* (Wilmington: Scholarly Resources, 1984), 275.
3. Charles P. Kindleberger, *The World in Depression, 1929–1939* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973).
4. These characteristics are largely derived from Charles P. Kindleberger, "Hierarchy versus Inertial Cooperation," *International Organization*, 40 (Autumn 1986), 841.
5. Theodore H. White, *Fire in the Ashes* (New York: Harper & Row, 1953), 359. See also White's *In Search of History: A Personal Adventure* (New York: Harper & Row, 1978), 273–318.
6. For two fine accounts of the international property regime, see Charles Lipson, *Standing Guard: Protecting Foreign Capital in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985); Kenneth A. Rodman, *Sanctity versus Sovereignty: The United States and the Nationalization of Natural Resource Investments* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988). The quotation is from Rodman, 325–6.
7. Franz Schurman, *The Logic of World Power: An Inquiry into the Origins, Currents, and Contradictions of World Power* (New York: Pantheon, 1974), 46–8.
8. Thomas J. Schoenbaum, *Waging Peace and War: Dean Rusk in the Truman, Kennedy and Johnson Years* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1988), 193. For good accounts of the race issue in American foreign policy during the Cold War, see Mary L. Dudziak, *Cold War Civil Rights: Race and the Image of American Democracy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000) and Thomas Borstelmann, *The Cold War and the Color Line: American Race Relations in the Global Arena* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2001).
9. Richard Peells, *Not Like Us: How Europeans have Loved, Hated, and Transformed American Culture since World War II* (New York: Basic Books, 1997), 37–63; Frank A. Ninkovich, *The Diplomacy of Ideas: US Foreign Policy and Cultural Relations 1938–1950* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 139–83. The number of students is found on 139. For the ban on Coke, see Richard Kuise, *Seducing the French: The Dilemma of Americanization* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 38, 64.
10. Walter Millis, ed., *The Forrestal Diaries* (New York: Viking, 1951), 281.
11. Quoted from Thorne, *Allies of a Kind*, 515.
12. For the short version of this story, see Andrew Wyatt-Walter, "The United States and Western Europe: The Theory of Hegemonic Stability," in Ngaire Woods, *Explaining International Relations Since 1945* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 134–7. For a longer version, see Thomas W. Zeiler, *Free Trade. Free World: The Advent of GATT* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1999).

13. This section builds in very large part on chapter 4 in my *"Empire" by Integration: The United States and European Integration, 1945–1997* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998), 29–39.
14. A good account of the Western response to the blockade is found in Avi Shlaim, *The United States and the Berlin Blockade, 1948–49: A Study in Crisis Decision-Making* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983).
15. For earlier drafts of this section, see my "Empire by Invitation? The United States and Western Europe, 1945–1952," *Journal of Peace Research*, 23:3 (Sept. 1986), 263–77, particularly 268–9, and *The American "Empire"*, 54–62.
16. Peter Calvocoressi, *The British Experience 1945–1975* (Harmondsworth: Pelican, 1979), 10–13.
17. David Reynolds, "Britain," in Reynolds (ed.), *The Origins of the Cold War in Europe: International Perspectives* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994), 81–3.
18. Wm. Roger Louis and Ronald Robinson, "The United States and the Liquidation of the British Empire in Tropical Africa, 1941–1951," in Prosser Gifford and William Roger Louis (eds), *The Transfer of Power in Africa: Decolonization 1940–1960* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982), 31–55.
19. Joseph M. Jones, *The Fifteen Weeks: An Inside Account of the Genesis of the Marshall Plan* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1955), 7.
20. For Turkey's many invitations to the United States, see Ekavi Athanassopoulou, *Turkey: Anglo-American Security Interests 1945–1952* (London: Frank Cass, 1999).
21. F. Roy Willis, *France, Germany, and the New Europe 1945–1967* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1968), 8–12.
22. Cees Wiebes and Bert Zeeman, "Benelux," in Reynolds, *The Origins of the Cold War in Europe*, 167–93.
23. Good accounts of the Italian–American relationship are found in James Edward Miller, *The United States and Italy 1940–1950: The Politics of Diplomacy and Stabilization* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1986); Ilaria Poggiolini, "Italy," in Reynolds, *The Origins of the Cold War in Europe*, 121–43; Christopher Duggan and Christopher Wagstaff (eds), *Italy in the Cold War: Politics, Culture & Society 1948–58* (Oxford: Berg, 1995).
24. See the references under n. 15.
25. The quotation is from D. Cameron Watt, "Britain, the United States and the Opening of the Cold War," in Ritchie Ovendale (ed.), *The Foreign Policy of the British Labour Governments, 1945–1951* (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1984), 58. See also Alan Bullock, *Ernest Bevin: Foreign Secretary, 1945–1951* (London: Heinemann, 1983); Reynolds, "Britain," in Reynolds, *The Origins of the Cold War in Europe*, 77–95; Lawrence Aronsen and Martin Kitchen, *The Origins of the Cold War in Comparative Perspective: American, British and Canadian Relations with the Soviet Union, 1941–48* (Houndmills: Macmillan, 1988); Victor Rothwell, *Britain and the Cold War 1941–1947* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1982).
26. My version of the founding of NATO, a version I still basically adhere to, is found in my *America, Scandinavia, and the Cold War, 1945–1949* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1980), 167–97. The quotations are from 175, 179.

27. Georges-Henri Soutou, "France," in Reynolds, *The Origins of the Cold War in Europe*, 100.
28. This analysis of developments in France is based primarily on Soutou, "France" in Reynolds, *The Origins of the Cold War in Europe*, 96–120, and Charles Cogan, *Forced to Choose. France, the Atlantic Alliance, and NATO: Then and Now* (Westport: Praeger, 1997), 17–51.
29. Lundestad, *America, Scandinavia and the Cold War*, 290–328.
30. Miller, *The United States and Italy 1940–1950*, 266–71; Poggiolini, "Italy," in Reynolds, *The Origins of the Cold War in Europe*, 130–6.
31. Daniel J. Nelson, *A History of US Military Forces in Germany* (Boulder: Westview, 1987), 45.
32. Rolf Tamnes, *The United States and the Cold War in the High North* (Oslo: Ad Notam, 1991), 79–85.
33. This section follows closely my original "'Empire' by Invitation" argument in "Empire by Invitation?", *Journal of Peace Research*, 272–3.
34. Alessandro Brogi, *A Question of Self-Esteem: The United States and the Cold War Choices in France and Italy, 1944–1958* (Westport: Praeger, 2002).
35. Septimus H. Paul, *Nuclear Rivals: Anglo-American Atomic Relations, 1944–1952* (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 2000), 141.
36. For a useful summing up of the most recent literature on the Marshall Plan, see Kathleen Burk, "The Marshall Plan: Filling in Some of the Blanks," *Contemporary European History*, 10:2 (2001), 267–94. See also Martin Schein (ed.), *The Marshall Plan: Fifty Years After* (New York: Palgrave, 2001).
37. The literature on CoCom is increasing. For a recent, convincing study, see Ian Jackson, "'Rival Desirabilities': Britain, East–West Trade and the Cold War, 1948–51," *European History Quarterly*, 31:2 (2001), 265–87.
38. See Alan S. Milward *The Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1945–51* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984) and also his *The European Rescue of the Nation-State* (London: Routledge, 1992).
39. For the Marshall Plan numbers, see Charles S. Maier, "The Two Post-war Eras and the Conditions for Stability in Twentieth-Century Western Europe," *The American Historical Review*, 86:2 (1981), 342.
40. Charles L. Mee, Jr., *The Marshall Plan: The Launching of the Pax Americana* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984), 246.
41. The quotation is from Cabinet Papers, EPC 5 (49), 23.5.49, Cab.134/192 found in Teddy Brett, Steve Gilliat, and Andrew Pople, "Planned Trade, Labour Party Policy and US Intervention: The Successes and Failures of Post-War Reconstruction," *History Workshop*, Spring 1982, 138.
42. Lundestad, "Empire by Invitation?", 268. In *The American "Empire"* I strengthened this formulation further and wrote that "Neither the Europeans nor any other foreigners could determine US foreign policy. This was done in Washington largely on the basis of America's own interests" (56).

3

The Atlantic Community, Germany's Role, and Western Europe's Integration, 1950–1962

America's Domination and Europe's Centrality

After the uncertainties of the very first years after 1945, the US had gradually developed clear-cut objectives for Western Europe. On the whole, it was able to secure these objectives, by far the single most important of which was to limit Soviet expansion. After the "fall" of Czechoslovakia in 1948, no European country joined the Soviet bloc. To fight "Soviet Communism" the resources of the United States and Western Europe had to be coordinated. To Washington this meant that Western Europe had to be fitted into an Atlantic framework. NATO was the most important part of this framework; originally set up on European initiative, once, in March 1948, London had persuaded Washington to commit itself to the idea of an Atlantic security organization, the United States was to heavily influence, sometimes to decide more or less on its own, the policies of this organization: who the members were to be, its military strategy, its overall attitude towards the Soviet Union, and, to a much lesser extent, the level of defense spending in the member countries. With the American system of domination went a comprehensive system of US bases including virtually every allied country, from the wide network of such bases in West Germany and Britain and to the "facilities" to be used in times of crisis in Denmark and Norway.¹

From 1950 it also became essential for the United States to have the larger part of Germany, West Germany, on its side even militarily, either directly in the form of West Germany's membership in NATO or, more indirectly, by its membership in a European defense organization which in turn was linked to NATO. European integration was under no circumstance to lead to an independent "third force," but was to be part of the Atlantic structure under America's leadership.

On the domestic side, America's overriding goal was to keep the Communists and their "fellow-travellers" out of power. On the right, fascists and extreme nationalists were also to be excluded. With the small exception of Iceland in 1956–8, where a leftist bloc including Communists actually participated in the